Global security: China on the threshold of a new era. Assembly of Western European Union Forty-Fifth Session Document 1674, 29 November 1999 by Baumel, IrIr
.=-9,
DOCT'MENT 1674
Assembly of Western European Union
FORTY-FIFTII SESSION
29 November 1999
f ]-].otor*, Coa:m.mi,sstron Dobgotlon
.i.-1i,61"n
a::',r3 Id Stree:, I{IBU lt:aehingu;on, DG RCIOgy
FEE 0 I efl0dl
Fq
N
@$
Global security: China on the threshold of a ne\4r era
REPORT
submifted onbehalf ofthe Political Corrmittee
by IrIr Baumel Chairman and Rapporteirr
ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN ELIROPEAI.I IINION
43, avenue du President-Wilson"71771 Paris Cedsr( 16
Tel. 01.53.67.22.00 
- 
Fa:s 01.53.67.22.01
E-mail : assembly@weu.iut
Idernet: hQ://www.weu.int/asse,mbly/welcomeJrhl
Document 1674 29 November 1999
Global secarity: China on the threshold of a new era
REPORTI
submitted on behalf of the Political Committed
by Mr Baunel Chairman andRapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION
on Global swurity China onthethreshold of anew era
DGI-ANIATORY MEMORANIDUM
submitred by IrIr Baumel Chairman and Rapporteur
L hoduction
tr. Economic developmed
m. Human rights and political freedom
ry. Relationswithneighbouringcouffiies
V. RelationswithTaiwan
VI. Relations with Russia
VII. China's reliations withthe Unitd States
VItr. China's relations withthe European Union
DC The role ofthe UnitdNations
X. Spy case
)O. The bombing ofthe Chinese Embassy in Belgade
)il. Prese,m state of China's anned forces andtheirmodefldsation
)Otr. China's nuclear forces and ballistic missile syst€rn
)OV. China'snon-proliferationpolicy
X\/. China andthe crisis in East Timor
XVI. China's accessiontotheWorld Trade Organisation (U/TO)
APPENDD(
A short bibliography of reced literature on China
I Adopted rmarimously by the Comiree.
2 Members of the Committee; Mr Baumel (Chainnan); lvftvl Blaouw, N ... Mce-Chairmen); lvfr/I Behrendt,
Bianchi (Alternate: Nzi), Brancati Srt Syfuey Chapman,l\tfrll Clerfnyt, Cusimano, Dias, I!fts Dumonq IWs
Durrieu, MM Ehrmann, Evangelisti Eyskens, Fayot, Guwdots I Canb6, Haadq Hornhaes, Lord Kirkhill
(Alternate: O'Hwa), MM Le,moine, Liapis, van der hd€m, Mmshall, Mstlnez Casd, Micheloyiannis, Ivlrs
Nagy, Lord Ponsonby,MMPuche Rodr[guez,Roseta, SchmiZ, Skoularikis, Sterzing, Timmermals (Alternate:
Valk),Yolcic (Altenute: Mrs Sqtmcialupi), Wray (Alternate:Ws),Ydez-Brnuevo,N....
Associate members:MM. Adanczyh, Ak4ali,lvlrsAkgdneng,lvfri Bal, Gandersen, Kosmo, Pdlsson, Pastusiak.
N.B.The narnes of those takingpart in thevote re printed in italics.
482.1 t\,
DOCUMENT 1674
Drafi Reconrnandation
on global seewily: China on the tlrahold of a new qa
The Assembly,
(i) Noting that Deng Xiaoping's mode,rnisation initiative of l97E produced impressive results in
terms of rapid social, economic and technological developme,m of certain areas of China 
- 
such as the
arca aromd Shanghai 
- 
bw also an rmwexress of grouth in coasal districts, as coryared to the imerior,
of a magnrtude such as to call the courffy's rmity imo question if the discrepancy becomes more pro-
nounce4
(i, Noting, howwer, tbat the combination of stict Comuist PaAy cortrol over the couffiy and
the establislmem of a market economy of sorts in c€rtain areas has catrsed anomalies that may sooner
orlaterhavermforeseeable conseqneirces; - -
(iii) Noting that the Chinese Conrmunist Party, although to all appearances not prepared to r€normce
its supremacy, is adqting limit€d reforms 
- 
inter alta e*ndmgthe sco,pe of dmocracy at grassroots
level 
- 
which make the political system more responsive to public opinioq
(iu) RegrsEing that eftstive institutional protection for individual righs and freedoms is still lacking
in China and ttrat too many Chinese citizens, in partioilar political dissidems and mmbers of etbnic and
religious minorities, coffinue to suffer human righs abuses that are unacce,ptable;
(v) Considering that China's €ffiy ido the World Trade Organisation wil greatly coffiibute to fu
closer ido the ide,mational and to ftrth€r ugemtly needd political, economic,
social and legal reform;
(vi) Consid€ring that the disputes and differences betwe€n China and other nations as a consequence
of China's objective to establish its position as a primary power in the South China Sea can be resolved
ody in apeaceful marmer;
(vii) Consideringthatthe developmem of relations betvve€n China and Taiwan can only come about
on a vohmtary, peaceful and democratic basis and by agreemed between both parties;
(iit) Aware that China is atarmd by what it rEgards as the Unit€d States idenremionist
foreign policy and the seemingly receding role of the United Ndions Security Council as a mandating
authority for military actioq
(in Aware that Chine fearing the emergence of a r riFolar world where it could be hmed in by
United States hegemony, is seeking to smengthen its ties with other possible spheres of influence, such
as Eurqle, in order to establish a muhipolar world based on a syst€m of more wenly disEibuted c,heclrs
and balances;
(x) Considering that wery possible e,ffort must be made to ohance swurity and stabftty in East
Asia, and that China must refrah from defmce sales and more particularly sales of conven-
tional ornuclear deliverymeailt to rqgional andthird-world couffiies as this migh fuel a rEgional arms
race with destabitising consqp€nces;
(xi) Aware that at preselrt the performance of China's armed forces in no way m@sures up to their
size and that it will take many years yet for the mode,rnisation progr:rnmes now underway to remedy
major deficiencies both in and forces strucEre to yield tangible results;
(rtil Desirous that China should accord frr grecer priority to democratisation and economic and
social dwelopmed than to military modenrisatioq
(xiii) Welcoming China's first steps towards compliance with mrclear and conventional non-prolif-
eration agre€lne,rts,
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RECOMMENDS THAT TI{E COI,]NCIL
l. Use wery endeavour to pre\rcd sales of sophisticated defe,nce equipmemtto East Asian and third-
world counties wherethere is a riskthey could revive a rqgional orirternational ilms ftrce;
2. Recomendthe European Cormcilto:
- 
coftinue its unstiming pursuit of its aim for China's full and rapid imegration into the interna-
tional conrmunity, both in political and economical t€,rms, thereby coffiibuting to its democra-
tisation;
- 
uie its good offices with atl the parties irvolved to ensure that the dwelopment of reldions
betwe€n China and Taiwaq including their possible union, takes place ody by agreemed
betweenthetwo sides concemd on avoludary, peaceful and democratic basis;
- 
actively purcue iB €xisting human rights dialogue with Chin4 insisting that China urgently
improve compliance with basic human rights and fundamemtal freedoms, especially with re-
gard to political dissid€ds and religious and etbnic, in particular Tibetan, minorities;
ensure that in its cdinuing political dialogue with Chin4 both the principle of a peaceful
balanosd, multipolar world and the primacy of the United Nations Security Council's role are
adsnowledged as the most importat guararxtees ofglobal peace, security and stability.
DOCI.]MENT 1674
Erylanaory Mqnoranhtm
(submifred by Mr Baanel Chairvtot anil Rqryortear)
L lntroduaion
1. The Preside,fial Corrmittee paid a visit to
China in September 1999. In terms of State pro-
tocol, the Corrmittee was freat€d with the utuost
consideration, which suggests itrerest onthe part
of the Chinese authorities. There were three di-
me,nsions to the visit political dialogue, the state
of play as regards the wonomy and trchnology
and historical and cutarral aspects including
leisue. The impression gained was that, in the
political arena, the Chinese ryished to go no fur-
ther than preliminary cdacts, which prevmed
more indepth exchanges of ideas from develop-
ing or a firming up of views in c€rtain areas. Be
tbc as it may, the talks made it possible to out-
li.e a progratn-e for the firUrre.
2. Drring the vis( the Presidemtial Commit-
tee met:
- 
the Chairman of the Standing Commit-
tee of the National People's Congress,
Mr Li Peng;
- 
the Deputy Foreign Minister of China
IvIrWangYingfrn;
- 
the Vice{hairman of the Standing
Commiree of the National People's
Congress, IvIr Jian Chrmyuq
- 
the Vice-Chairman of the State Cemal
Mlitary Committee, Mr Chi Haotian;
- 
the Chairman of the Standing Commit-
tee of the People's Congress of Quin-
dao, Mr SunBing5nre;
- 
the Chairman of the Standing Commit-
tee of the People's Congress of Shang-
hai l[rs Che,n Tiedi;
- 
the Chairman of Shanghai Jinqiao Lim-
ited Corporation.
The following paragraphs provide an insight to
the impressions gained on the visit.
IL Economic development
3. At preseng China is focusiag mainly on
dwelopmd of its domestic economy. Visits by
the WEU Assembly's Presideflrtial Commiuee to
Qingdao 6d $hanghai showed an economy €x-
panding orponentially, with a strong curert of
inveshent and erylosive growth in urban areiu.
With a potemtial market of some I 200 million
oonsurneni, almost ay comercial rcmrre seemr
to promise success, eqpeciatly at a time when
mode,r:r infrastrucnre is starting to emerge.
4. Howwer, appearances may be d@eptive.
The State Statistics Brueau has postrrlated a
GDP growth rz;teof 7.8%oin 1998, slighlybelow
the target figure of 8%o, suggesting that govern-
med policy has offset most of the adverse as-
pects of the Asian economic crisis and weak
domestic dsrnand. The target for GDP grouflh
rate in 1999 was lYo. Most experts considEr the
figures for Chinese economic grourh to be over-
stated by at least 2% ed in addition poid out
that these may need to be rwised dovmwards by
a further 2%o as there are no buyers for many
prodncts and some 23%ogrowthis accoumed for
simply by a nafirral increase in the labour forcer.
When such factors are taken imo accout, the
official growth rate dwindles virhrallyto zero.
5. Addressing the Ndionaf People's Con-
gress (NPC) on 5 March 1999, Prime Minister
fru Rongii declard that although in 1998 eco-
nomic gfowth rate targets had been laryely
achiwd the economic order in the coumy was
in disarray, financial discipline lax and market
dmandfeeble.
6. Notwithstanding the impressive dwelop
meffi of the Chinese econorn% eqpecialty in the
economic developmemt zones, the problems that
could lead to a serious economic crisis are rnany.
Qhina's influence in the globat market [s5 rrrrtr'l
now been insignincam and it camot make use of
inveshetr, high-technology prdtrcts or coffiol
of a leading+dge industry to dominate sectors of
the world market. Recem economic growth has
beeir more dependem on resource use than m
enhancing productivity through high tec,holory.
If China does not focus far more on tle acquisi-
tion and exploitation of high tec,hology, eco-
nomic dwelopme,ff may soon run out of steam-
7. The prese,nt performance of China's sci-
ence and technology sector is not due solely to a
lack of resources but also to instifirtional and
t The konomist,2 Octob€r f999.
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syste,mic consrafuts that will take a long time to
dismantle.
8. Mention should also be made of the fol-
lowing proble,ms whic,h are likelyto have a nEga-
tive impact on the econorny s@ner or later: de-
clining govemmerrt rwenues, a fragile Sanking
system, corrupt business practices, growing un-
employment and a large number of debt-ridden
industriat giafis.
9. In order firrther to develop and consolidate
itself as a credible and effective economic power
China will need to reform its political instiu-
tional and social infrasfucnre.
10. Some years agq when inflation was the
major tlreat to China's economic growt\ the
go\rermeffi saw the example of South Korea's
chaebolsz as a solution to its problems and
stafi€d to transform the state sector iffio a num-
ber of conglomerates in which the profits of the
small consumer-orierted companies would help
huge '1ame ducks" survive r.rtil such time as the
tec,hnological revolution brough about their mi-
raculous resurrection The Asian crisis, :tccorn-
panied by the failure ofthe Korean chaebol esn-
cept and the reduction of China's tade surplus,
has forced the goverrm€xt to retbink its policy.
11. The manufrcauing industry as a whole
has to be privatised. It is codinuing to absorb
more and more savings, without paying taxes and
while producing huge amouds of lowquality
producs which merely add to €xisting s0oclss and
increase deflationary pressures. However, this
would mean the end of the Chinese version of the
Comqmist Pafiy which keeps its hold over the
privileged urban population by atlowing only
limited aocess to cfies and their services, and
life-long jobs md marked social
progress.
12. Under the curre,t syst€m, state-owned
companies have special relationships with private
companies owned by former govermemt offi-
cials. Such relationships tend to lead to the for-
mation of monqtolies and to eliminate competi-
tion and breed comrption
13. Very litle has been done to tansform the
inefficie,t state-ovmed companies that will be a
2 Conglomeraes of large nrmbers of oompmies chrs-
t€red aromd x holding conpary. They re highty cen-
tralised and spead norizomat$ across the field of in-
fustrialactivity.
growing burdeir on the econorny. When Prime
Minister fru Rongii came to office in March
1998, he promised to shut dovm most of China's
non-perfoming sEte infirsties within tbree pars.
Howwer, because of fierce opposition from con-
servatives, his efforts have to date met with litle
success. In the las week of September 1999,
after the meeting of the Party's Ce,tral Com-
mittee, the People's Daily cominred to reaffrm
that privatisation of large state derprises was
not an option The September 1999 report of the
Communist Party's Ceffial Corrrmitee ha^s now
pushed the three-year deadline back to 2010.
Another reason for the decision was to minimiss
the.number of workers being made redrmdad.
Moreover, the political leadership also regards it
as a w:ry of increasing coililmer qpending and
tackling spiraling defldicm- The stdeosmed sec.tor
accouts for 41.9%o of the economy, as against
56.2% in 1978. According to official statistics
releasd in August 1999, 39.lyo of state-ovmed
ootrcenrs are losing money.
14. There are also huge proble,ms with the
lanking syst€m" ffus Sanks have been ordered by
the goverrmeart to gfaff loans to totally ineffi-
ciem state companies that report profits while in
fapl making losses and living offnew bank loans
to pay workers and old debts. The state seclor
consumes abovt 70%o of loans but coffirbutes
less than half of GDP. Many property dwelop-
66m[ [sans are lost through building activity tlat
is wholly qpeculative 
- 
it is reportd that in
Shanghai alone around 70%o of office space
stands vaca$.
15. In 1998, the govern-ent ordered banks to
make an additional US$ 12 billion in loans, most
of whic,h were used to support state-ovmed com-
panies or to create unnecessary capacity. The
much-needed reform ofthose companies is bEing
postponed because the governmeut is worried
about the corsequences of many more millions
unemployed without a welfare safety net.
16. Experts estimate the number of unem-
ployed in China's urban arcas at some
16 million, and many more millions of unem-
ployed workers are migrating iuto the cities from
the couffiyside. The inability of the state-oqmed
companies to pay their workers is a source of
instability in the *rust belt" that stretches from
the far north+ast in Heilongiiang through Xian
to Wuhar, Chengdu and Choagguing. The fact
that these companies are uoable to repay credit
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means tha loans of some US$ 500 million, or at
l@stzsyo of all bank loans, are unperforming.
17. The four big state-oumed banks are in a
desperate siaration because of this accumulated
bad debt. In an effort to clean up the Sanking
sector, the Chinese Govermeirt has already es-
tablished two asset managemetr connpanies 
-
China Orim Asset Management (for the Bank of
China) and Cinda Asset Managemem (for the
China Construction Ba"k) 
- 
in order to prwed
those banls beiag banknryted by bad debt accu-
mlated during years of statedirected lending. It
is still, howerrer, qpento doubt as to whetherthey
qs change the habits 6f managers tained to fill
quotas in a cemtralised economy rather than to
earnprofits.
18. Another major problem for the goverrmed
is tlat Chinese oonsium€rs do not spend enoug!-
They save around 40Yo of thefi income in bank
accouds because they lack confidence in eco-
nomic developned. Many people are afraid that
their jobs in the over large and ineffici€rrt state-
owned companies may be wipd out and that
they are no longer guararteed pmsions, subsi-
dised healthcare and housing.
19. Not surprisingly, tbe sihration as described
above has led to growing reluctance to corrrmit
on the part offoreign investors. Foreign invest-
mentin Chinais expectedto fallto abow US$ 27
billion in 1999 from about US$ 40 billion in
1998.
20. In 1978, Deng Xiaqing declared that
henceforth economic consruction would take
precedence over the class sruggle. The Erestion
remains whether China's Conrmunist Pafiy will
be able to manage the necessary political tans-
formation in the coming yeanl asi successfully as
it managed economic tansformation over the
past twemty. For the time being, the Party sees
itself as the only body capable of directing the
coutry.
21. Economic reform in China has nou,
rear,hed a stage where not only economic, but
also social and political resources will need to be
reallocated. With the abandoning of the plaoned
economy in favour of a more capitalist market
econorny, there is no longer equal distribution of
benefits and earniags. The interests of those who
be,nefit most do not necessarily coincide with the
ift€rests ofthe state. Te,ns of millions of workers
are already rme,mployed as a resuh ofthe atmpt
to streamline state emterprises.
22. The State will have to mediate between
rich and the poor if it wams to avert social disas-
t€r. It s€ms that the Cornmrmist Party and the
State are incapable of doing so given that th€y
are afraidto imoduce eve,r suchbasic dwices as
geminely democratically comested elections, a
free press and an independgrtjudiciary.
IIL Human ights and political freedom
23. In September 1998, Prime Minister fru
Rongii came out in favour of freedom of speech
and of association- Howwer, in Nove,mber 1998,
Li Peng Chairman ofthe National People's Con-
gress and the second-highest official in the corm-
fy, emphasisedthatthe Commmist Party would
not tolerate any political opposition
24. Since 1978, significaut political changes
and imprweme,fis in human rights observ"ance
have taken place in Chin4 bw last year the gov-
emm€d ag:ain clamped doqm on human rights
and imoduced tigher control over access to the
Iuternet and foreign news. On 5 IMay, it ordered
dozens of illegal and licensed cable TV stations
to r€move foreign satellite programmes from
their services. Many similar activities formed
part ofthe governmed's policy of kesping a tigh
gip olthe media inthe run-up to the tetrh ami-
versary of the Tianamen Square massacre. The
authorities are clearly detennined to draw a dis-
tinction betwemthe approved use of the Iftemet
and its use for "improper purposes" which in-
cludes the spreading of "subnersive" political
ideas. The govemmem has also set up a spwiat
taskforce to monitor use of the henret and to
block sites deemed undesirable. Analysts have
doubts wheth€r it is tec,hically possible to re-
stict the exchange of political information com-
plaely. Most of the authorities in power are
afraid that a new opposition party would make
oormon cause with the many unemployed to
form a rftal social de,mocratic paffy.
25. The China Democratic Party, established
in 199E, called on ttre Corrmunist Party to allow
the introduction of a political opposition. In De-
cember ofthat yqlr, one of fu proponelrts, Wang
Yucar, was charged with zubversionand given an
ll-year sentence. Two others received sertences
of 13 and 12 years respectively and nearly all
6
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party leaders have now beeir arrested and uied or
are awaitingtial.
26. In a report published on'20 April 1999,
Amnesty hte,rnationat accused the auttorities in
Xinjiang of "gross and systematic human righs
violations", a[eging ttrat they had routinely ar-
rested, tortued and executed ethnic Uighrs in
the region as part of a systemmic campaign to
keep the population and separatist terrorist or-
ganisations under cotrtrol.
27. Fahm Gong, a movemed based on a
qpiriaul theory dwelopd in the early 1990s
whic,h draws on a blmd of traditional Chinese
exercises and Buddhist and Taoist religious be-
liefs, was declard an illegal organisation by the
goverrment in luly 1999, on the grormds that it
was a cuh with political ambitions to subvert the
power of the Communist Pafiy. Since then, the
govencmelrt has beeir conducting a caryaign to
wipe out what it has descnbed as an "svil sect"
through the "re+ducation" of its erstwhile mem-
bers and qpells in detfftion or labour camps for
those cotrinuing to practise their beliefs. Since
the end of September 1999, an estimated 3 000
Falun Gong supporters have been arrested. Their
total number is unlnovm bw is said to be be-
tween 2 and l0 millionthroughout China.
28. On his receirt visil to China on 15 Nove,m-
ber 1999, Unit€d Nations SecretaryGeneral Kofi
Aman declarcd that the Chinese Foreign Minis-
ter had assured him that the "fundamertal righs"
of Fahrn Gcng practficners were being obs€ryed3.
29. Compatibility betwe€n a conununist re-
gime and a market econorny appears to be fairly
hard to maintain and time will telt in this corrnec-
tion how the regime and its stnrchres evoh/e in
the face of changes in society and attiurdes. In
any eve,rt, the challenge is enormous and one that
will be watched closely around the worl4 as it is
not clear for the time being whether China will
move in the direction of social democracy or
towards cre€ping economic liberalim under an
authoritarian regime.
30. On the other han4 many officials admit
informallya, and it was also acknowleged furing
the Assembly's Presidemtial Corrrmitee visit, ftat
some change will be necessary. Some reformers
' 
Intemational Herald Tibune, 17 November 1999.
o *Chinaafift/',The fuonomr:vr,2 ftober 1999.
back atempts to give the partydirected judiciary
more independence. Li-Pe,ng, by no means a lib-
era! supports attempts by the state media to
nncover and goverrme,nt wastage. In
the villages, village leaders are elected, bw out-
side the villages experiments in accountable gov-
ernmemt have largely be€n shelved.
31. The presed leadership is clearly aiming
for a stronger state role. It is tying to steady the
economy through beter contol of what remains
in state hands. Will Prime }vlinister fru Rongii
succeed in saving the regime withoutthe party or
state Foperty, as seers 1o 6s ffi aim?
32. Presid€d Jiang Zenin, on his recent state
visits to the United Kingdom and France de-
f€rded China's human rights record, saying that
China was moviag towards dsmocracy, but that
it was imporant to preserve social stability. He
described an EU report on human rights as
"itrte,rfe,rence in the ifternal aftirs" of China,
adding that democracy was not an absolute con-
cept, bW one that was "relative to the character-
istics of each couffiy''5.
33. Earlier, on 23 April 1999 atthe LJN Com-
mission on Human Righs in Gensn4 China suc-
ceeded in defeating a US-sponsored resolution
cond€rrning fu human righs record. A no-action
motion was adopted by 22 votes to 17 with 14
absteffions, which meatr that the resolution
couldnotbe debated orvoted on-
M Relarions with neighbouring countriq
34. China's relations with neighbouring corm-
nies are no longer basically guided by ideology
andthe emphasis is rather on developing friendly
ties with lhem regardless of ideological convic-
tion After the collapse of the bipolar worl4
China realised that the developmed of regional
or sub-regional blocs could afford new qppor-
amities for dealing withthe West and in partior-
lar a possibly hegemonistic United States. Chi-
nese poliry in the rEgion therefore aims to sreate
an e,nvironmed cmducive to China's orvn eco-
nomic modemisation and national secuity.
35. China's policy towards surrormding coun-
tries has a twofold objective: to settle border
disputes through consultation and negotiatim and
to preved alliances betwe€n its neighbours and
outside hostile powers. This policy has obviously
s International Herald Tlibme, 26 Oarfxr 1999.
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been shaped bythe dynamics of China's relations
with global powers, in particular the United
States, and by the interaction betwe€n China it-
self and regional rinals such as Japan and India.
36. With these aims in view, China has nor-
malised and iryroved its relationship with Rlts-
sr4 Indi4 Mongohq South Korea, Pakistan and
other couufries of the rq4on It also became a
full dialogue paxtner ofASEAI.I ln1994.
37. China has always taken a firm line on the
disputes involving the 'lost" territories of Hong
Kong,I\dacao and Taiwaq arguingtlatboth eth-
nically and historically the people of those ter-
ritories are 
.C. hinese. Hong Kong rwerted to
China m 1997 and l\,Iacao will do likewise in
Dece,mber 1999. Taiwan's case is more compli-
cated and will be discussed in the n€xt chaper.
38. China is still involved in se\reral border
disputes with a number of corffiies in the regoa
- 
with Vietnam oner the dernarcation of the
Tonkin Gulf and with Japan over the Senkaku
Islands, a goup of islets on the edge of the cotri-
nemal she[, northeast of Taiwan-
39. The most important multilateral disprte
ooroerns the Spratly Islands situdd in a region
of great nafural potential, whose resourcs in-
clude oil deposits. China mairtains that fu mad-
time borders run from Taiwan south-westwards
atong the coast of the Philippines, Ea* Mala5nia
and Bnmei and northwards, roughly along the
coast of Vietnam- These extensive territorial
claims in the South China Sea may wen extend
as frr as Indonesia's sas-rich Natuna Islands at
the ease,rn emtrance of the Malacca Stait. Re-
cemly, China concluded a bilateral agreemd
with Malaysia and is courting Thailand which
has no claims in the South China Sea. The Phil-
ippines, BruneU Vietnam and Indonesia dispute
China's claims and are tying to resist Chinese
shategic pressure inthe South China Sea.
40. In 198t, Vietnam was involved in a mili-
tary spat with China over the Paracels Islands,
which China seized from Vietnam m 1974, nd
still occupies most of the Spratly Islands. The
Pbilippines has stepped up its claims to the is-
lands and has protested against Chinese con-
stnrction activity on Mischief Reef. In early
1995, China start€d building on Mischief Reef
arguing, in response to pro0ests from ASEAI{
couffiies, that the consEuctions were fishermen's
shelters. Tensions eased when, later that year,
China and the Philippines sig1ed a "code of con-
duct". In late 1998, howwer, China again step-
ped up its activities on and around the reef. The
Philippines nos, accusqr China of having turned
the reef imo a high-tech military base. Many ob-
serveni argue that Mischief Reef is another
stepping stone in China's slow naral progrcss
doum the South China Sea. China howwer, is
not prepared to gne up its claims to sovereigmy
over the islands and it would appear that the
crisis in East Timor has led to a hardening of its
posfion (see Chaper X\I).
41. China is unlikely to give up its overall
claimto sovereigtry over most ofthe South Cti-
na Sea. Howwer, political anal5s tend to argue
that suc,h e,lcensive territodal claims are based
primarily on emotion and ideology, rather than
on any national assessmeat of the country's oil
and gas requiremems.
42. There appea$ to be no coilrcruns among
the various frctions in China about the formula-
tim of a policy for the South China Se4 but nor
is there much indication at presed that China is
prepared to enforce its claims through aggressive
militarymeans.
43. Presidem lizrrgZemin had already stdsd,
on arecedvisitto Thailan4 that "China is ready
to have in{epth discussions with the relevad
ASEAII coumies m the principles and ways of
safeguarding pace and sability in this region, as
well as in the South China Sea'{. China is, how-
wer, opposedto referring any of its claims to ttre
Ime,mational Court of Justice or the Imemational
Tribunal forthe Law ofthe Sea.
44. Undersandably, China's refirsal to con-
sider multilateral negotiatioDs or arbitration to
resolve the dispute, while at the same time mod-
exrising fu naral, aryhibious and air forces, is
causing concem to ASEAI.I coumies.
45. At the Associatim of Sotrth-East Asian
Nations surrmit meeting in Manila at the end of
Novmber 1999, ASEANI political leaders might
adopt a code of conduct forbidding claimads to
the disputed Spratly Islands from using force or
the threat of force, or expanding their presence
there. China would be asked to sign the code.
46. China's reliations with Japan are not with-
out their difrculties. Dudng the first half of the
6 Intemational Herald Tribwe,22 Norrcmber 1999.
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ce,mrry the two were deadly enernies and Japan
for many years occupied large tacts of Chinese
temitory. Since the end of the second world war,
Japanhas c,onsiste,tty cultivated a close relation-
ship withthe United Staes 
- 
which includes far-
reaching security arangern€ds 
- 
to protect fuelf
against China.
47. In 197E, the two couuties signed a pe:lce
trra;ty. Howwer, noturithstanding a relationship
that is to all appearances a friendly one, mistnrst
betweexr th€an is engraineq afthough they are
aware that there is no alternative brrt for the,m to
get along with one another. As a resulg both
stive constantly to codain the other's influence.
4E. China is tying to discourage Japan from
aspiring to ftAionaf badeffihip or taking a bigger
polilical role in the world. ft is opposed to Japan
dweloping into an important military power and
has criticised rec€ilt moves to sEengthen military
ties betwe€n Japan and the United States. Japan
does not waut the Taiwan Stait to be excluded
frcm its secrlrity agre€med with the Llnited Staes
and rcfirses to mest Chinese darrands r%arding Tai-
wm- Japan is also reluctaut to make large-scale
invesheds in China because it does not wad to
firtherthe dwelopm.ent of a potential rival.
49. China's reliations with India have im-
proved since the military clash in 1962 which
broughthemto an all-time low. In 1993, the two
coumies signed an agree,me,ff on maintaining
peace and tanquillity and an agreemert on oon-
fidence-building measures was signed in 1996,
with Presidetr liang Zffim visiting Tndia in the
same year. Nwertheless, there are still issues
causing tension in Sino'Indian relations.
50. For example, lndia is concemed about
China's close reliationship with Pakistan and the
fact that it has provided the later with the tech-
nology to dwelop its missile progrruilne futter.
India suspects China of using its relationship
with Pakistan as a brake on Indian influence in
the region- Furthermorg China has an on-going
border disputs with India over the south-eastern
I{imalaps and the Aksai Chin plateau.
51. Finally, there is unease betwee,n the two
couutries over Tibet. Indi4 while officially rec-
osising China's claim to Tibet, allowed the
Dalai Lama and the exiled Tibetan Governmem
to establish the,mselves in India and campaign for
independence.
52. Chinaaeeds help fromAsia's newly indus-
tialised counties in terms of capital inveshed
and expertise in modernisation-
53. There is no doubrt thd at presemt China's
first priority is its osm economic developmemt.
Notwithstanding fu rhetoric about using force to
achiwe its political ambitions in the neighboru-
hood, it is aware that a military conflict would
seriously damage opporarnities for essefitial co-
operationwith other countries inthe region-
V. Relaionswith Taiwan
54. China's relationship with Taiwan is a very
sensitive issue. The Chinese position is thd there
is but one China of which Taiwan is a part.
China has eradua[y shiftd fu poliry from lib-
erating Taiwan by force to peaceful reunification
according to a "cne cor.ffiy, two qrste,ms" for-
mula. This change of atiarde stimulated the de-
velopmed of economic relations anduade across
the Starl rose from US$ 5 billion in 1990 to
US$ 25 billion n 1997. Political reliations, how-
wer, remained officially non-existe,nt and hostile.
55. There are no direct government-to-gov-
ernment links between China and Taiwan and
cfirmmicdi@s betweeir thm take place tho€h
the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan
Strait (ARATS) in Beijing and the Straits Ex-
change Formdation (SEF) in Taipei.
56. After six years' cotracttlroughthese non-
official bodies, the two sides have y$ to gdt a
dialogue on security maters off the grormd or
wen to reach agremem on more down-to-earth
issues such as fishing disprtes or the repatriation
ofillegal imigrarts.
57. China's policy as regards Taiwan can only
be firlly understood in the cortext of the US pol-
icy towards the island which, &uing the cold war
eqpeciatly the United States regarded as a
stronghold against corrr'unim- When, m 1972,
the United States start€dto cultivate more cordial
reliations with Chin4 it published a communiqu6
joimly with China in which it "aclmowledged that
all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait
mairtain there is but one China and that Taiwan
is part of China".
58. In January 1979, the United States broke
offdiplomatic relations with Taiwan and recog-
nised the People's Rspublic of China. Howwer,
the Taiwan Relations Act passed by the US Gov-
9
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ernmetr that same year allowed it to protect
Taiwan while engagiqg with Chin4 and to con-
tinue to sell arms of a "defensive character" to
Taiwan. Inthe years that followe( Taiwan grad-
uallymade a successfultansition from one-party
authoritarianim to milti-party de,mocracy and
the first free and open parliamemtary elections
were held there in 1992. \\e first direct pre-
sidential election was held in 1996, whe,n Lee
Teng-hui was elwted preside,utby a wide margin.
59. The evemts in Tianamen Squarc in 1989,
cominuing repression of political disseders and
other failings in China's rword on huoan righs
and democracy were viewed askance by the US
Congress and resulted in greater support for
Taiwan in the 1990s. Notutithstanding a US-
China agre€m€tr signed in l9E2 whereby the
Unitd Stat€s would gradually reduce its anms
sales to Taiwan, weapons supplies from the US
gremr in volume and improved in quality in the
1990s and through them, and other weapons
sales and technology transfers, Taiwan is now
berer amed ttran wer with stmeof-the-art
equipmem in each of its tbree amed services.
60. In Octob€r 1997, t\e US Governmem
issued a new statemed of policy limiting its sup-
port for Taiwan, surnmed up in'tlree no's" and
reiterat€d by Presidm Clidon furi4g his visit to
China, on 30 Jrme 1998: *[we] dont support
independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one
Taiwan 
- 
one China. And we don't beliwe that
Taiwan should be a member of any organisdion
for which statehood is a requiremem".
61. Members of the US Congress concerned
about the Climon Administration's policy on Tai-
wan have put forward the Taiwan Security
Fnhancernetr Act, which seeks to enhance Tai-
wan's selfdefence capabilfy 
- 
in the words of
its sponsors':inttre frce ofthe People's Republic
of China's rmprecededed military build-up". The
Act would, inter alia, establish direct conrmuni-
cations between the US military and Taiwan. It
also authorises Taiwan's inclusion in a possible
theafre missile defence systm" Congress ha^s,
howwer, decided to postpone consideration of
the Taiwan Secudty Fnhanc€rngnt Act rmtil next
year.
62. Chin4 is opposed to the Act because, if
adopted and implemerte( it woul{ de facto,
include Taiwan in a US-led military alliance,
restore the 1954 US-Taiwan Muhul Defence
Treary 
- 
abandoned when the US normalised its
relations with China 
- 
and gradually overtunthe
presfi.status Eto tnthe Taiwan Stait.
63. The Chinese Governmed also considers
Taiwan's possible inclusion in a US-sponsored
theafe missile defence system a very serious
mater because it would upgrade Taiwan to a de
facto US protectorde, i4oring China's sov€reigtry
claims ad the pr%ress thd has been made in
accomoddi@ and tovmrds rermificaio"
64. In a wider perspectivg the Chinese Gov-
ernmed is fiercely opposed to the deplo}anemt of
a US-sposored Asimthefre nisele defence sys-
tem, regadingthis as part of an aggressive policy
of contaiment by the United States which could
result in a dangerous ilms race in the region"
65. Despite the US's protective and g€n€rally
srp,portive attiUrde towards Taiwan, the country
is nwertheless losing official ide,mational rec-
ognfion In July 1999, diplomatic reldions ex-
tended to oaly one European couffiy, FfROIvI,
ad 27 others in the rest of the world 
- 
mostly
srnall and impoverished nations, largely won over
by offers of substadial aid. Taiwan is, howwer,
a member of a number of iuternational organisa-
tions and China has a,geed to Taiwan's enty
imo the WTO as a "customs tsritoryl', subject
only to the condition of its own prior accession-
Taiwan's efforts to rejoin the United Nations and
i6 affiliated organisations havg howwer, failed.
66. Although it may be ditrcult for most out-
siders to appreciate, there are more shades to tbe
debate in Taiwan on its relations with the
People's Republic of China (PRC) than distad
observers tend to tlink Having hotly debated in-
depmdence versus reunffication in the early
1990s, the main political parties 
- 
the ruling
Kumintang (KIvfD and the opposition Demo-
cratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
- 
ire nonr moving
towards a joiut fom of words mphasising Tai-
wan's politicat i"dependence from the PRC Ow
not necessarily from China as a civilisation or
nation) snfl maint€nance ofthe status quo a$oss
the Stait. Alsq there is gmeral agreement that
the Rspublic of China (taiwan) ha^e beeir an
independ^n[ sovereign state since it was founded
n 1962 and that the PRC ha-s nwer exercised
authority over the island or collected
taxes from its population. An importad differ-
ence betwe€n the parties, howwer, is that the
DPP supports a refere,ndum to approve any
l0
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change in Taiwan's curreff staurs, while the
KMT argues that reunification with China is the
ultimate objective, but one that can only be ach-
iwed once China becomes a de,mocratic couffiy
and reaches a standard of living comparable to
tlat of Taiwan-
67. The bofiom line is therefore that the pre-
fere,rce ofthe overwhetning majority ofthe pop-
ulation of Taiwan lies in maintaining the status
(flto, either indefinitely or pennanently. The
people reject ramification with the PRC und€r
the *one couffiy, two systems" model advocated
bVBeijmg.
68. On 9 July 1999, relations betwe€n China
and Taiwan again deteriorated when President
lre Te,ng-hui declared thd in fuhrre coffacts
betwe€n the,m should be conilucted on a "special
stat€-to-state'basis. China warned
Taiwan tbat it was playing with fire and made
clear tlat it was prepared to use force to reoov€r
Taiwan.
69. The reactions from both the Chinese and
US Gove, ents made clear that neither was
happy with Presided Lee's re,marks. In Taiwao,
responses were mixed. Taiwan's Mainland Af-
fairs Cormcil stated that the Governmed had no
plans to rwisethe Constiurtion, under which Tai-
wan is now considered part of China. At the
same timg it emphasised Taiwan's commimert
to dialogue with Beijing and peaceful resolution
of the cross-Stait disputeT.
70. President Lee badcrar,ked to an e,*e,nt on
his earlier pronormcem€ds in making clear that
special siat€-to-state relations did not mean there
were two statest. An 28-29 August 1999, the
National Congress of the KMT adopt€d a reso-
lution stating that relations between the two sides
of the Srait must be ilefined as special state-to-
state relations, thus opening a new era for the
two partiese.
71. In recffit years, China has grovm increas-
ingly dissatisfied with the presemt sitration in
which Taiwan appea$ to be moving away from
Chin4 while steadily modemising and stremgth-
erdng its armed forces. The Chinese military
establishmert is usi4g dwelopme,nts in Taiwan
7 Walt Steet Jorrnal Errope,3 Argust 1999.
I Deftense Nev,s,30 Argu$ f999.
e LeMonde,3 September 1999.
as lwerage for mode,rnising China's anned
forces. Now that the Chinese Government has
succeeded in bringing Hong Koag and Macao
back under Chinese sovereignty, it no longer
seens wiUing to delay resolution of the Taiwan
proble,m indefinitely.
72. China has repeatedly threatened to use
military force in order to reunify Taiwan with
mainland China. Missiles were fired into the Tai-
wan Srait and rece,mly, in Septe,mber 1999,
during the WEU Assembly delegation's visig
amphribious landing exercises were held on the
mainland coast to show off China's capability.
According to a classified US Defense Depart-
med report leaked to the press on l0 Febnrary
1999, the Chinese amed forces had betwe€n 150
and 200 missiles aimed at Taiwan deployed in its
southenr rqgon The report claimed that China
planned to increase the number of missiles to 650
over the next few years.
73. Would China be capable of inrading and
Taiwan by military force? As matters
stand now, there is no doubt that China's anned
forces in no way match Taiwan's sate-of-the-art
forces aoned Eith leading-edge equipmeft, large-
ly acadred in the United States and France. All
the deficiencies mmioned earter and orperience
deriving from recert operations poim to the
inadequacy of the People's Liberation Army in
resolving the Taiwan iszue by force.
74. China's M-9 and DF-21 missiles can hit
targets in Taiwan only to within an accuracy of
100 metres, although high-accuracy 6rui5s mis-
siles are expected to be deployed by 2005. How-
ever, missiles are not enough to conquer Taiwan
militadly. The M-9 and DF-21 missiles have not
been iutegrated into an effective battlefield com-
mand and conaol syst€m. At the momed, the
Chinese naly and air force lack the capability to
mormt an amphibious assauh. It is estimated that
China couldmoum andtransfer an invasion force
to Taiwan consisting of one reinforced infutry
division and one division of paratoopers, which
falls far short of the 300 000 toops needed to
overrrm a beach.
75. In short, all the signs are that there will be
no violence: the financral and commercial ties
betwe€n the partners are strong and no-one
would dream of breaking the,m off. Taiwan's
total investnent in China is US$ 46 billion with
rougbly 46 000 Taiwanese-funded enterprises
l1
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op€rating in China today. China is looking for-
ward to more of the same. Nor does the Unitd
States waft to provoke a major crisis betne€n
Taiwan and China.
76. On 2 S€pt€mber 1999, at a hearing for his
appoinUnmt :N European Commissioner for
Ext€rnal Relations, Chris Pauen said it was im-
portaft to reduce tensions betwe€n Taiwan and
Beijing, addiqg 'T/hat matters is that reunifica-
tion should be vohrutary, peaceful and by agree-
med betwe€xr the two sides".
77. In conclusion, therefore, ncnwithsanding
its srong language and tlreas to use military
force, China is aware tla only comindng im-
proverned in its relations with Taiwan can €n-
sure the regular flow of inves[ned from the Chi-
nsss diaspora that is needed to couderact ttre t€n-
dency for national savings not to be converted
into consumption.
W. Relaionswith ktssia
78. Over the last decade, China's relations
with Russia have improved dramanically 
- 
partly
because both coumies had parallel imerests.
Each was involved in a process of economic re-
form and had a corrrmon int€rest in seorrity and
furtermal stability. Moreover, both were worried
about the United States' be,haviour in world af-
fairs and rying to establish themselves as coun-
t€rweights in a world apparemly dominated by
the United States.
79. A twice-yearly summit meeting systm at
preside,ffial and prime minister level initiated in
1992, h+q been instihrtionalised and what was
originally known as a "constuctive partnership"
is now refeired to as a "strategic cooperative
partnership". After the November 1997 Sumit,
an agree,merxt was reached on the eastern section
of the Sino-Russian border.
80. Recently, on l-3 June 1999, Russia's For-
eign Minister, Igor ftranov, paid an official visit
to China. In a joim after the visit,
both sides pledged to stre,ngthen their stratqgic
cooperative parhership. They also confirmed
they had reached a final agreemd on the de-
marcation of a conrmon border betwe€n the two
couutries, announcing thatthe relevad legal doc-
umemts would be signed shortly.
81. Military cooperation betwe€n the two
countries has also improved considerably. Most
of China's new military equipmemt ha-s bea or is
being acquired in Russia. China bough Sultoi
27 (equipped with AAl0 intennediate-range and
AAll short-range missiles) and Sulihoi 30 figh-
er aircraft, IL-76 AWACS-qrpe aircraft and
Phazoron Auk tr rada$ for its airforce while
tle Chinese nary acErired Russian Sowememy-
class desroyers and Kilo-class submarines, and a
modemrisation progamme for Romeo-class sub-
marines in cooperatim with Russia is under way.
China also ordered SS-N-22 ami-Sip missiles
for fu destroyers, and acquired Russian air-port-
able armoured vehicles and a prduction licence
for the Russian RPO-A Shel rocket lam&€r.
82. Because of the couuEy's urg€tr need for
caslr, the Russians had litde choice other than to
sell this equipmea*, but they are not coryletely
cotrfidd about possible long-term developments.
Amoderr Chinese army could rqlresed a fifrre
threat
WL China's reldions with
the United States
83. Owing to a number of rccd evds,
relations between China and the Unit€d States
hane become strained. China is worrid aboutthe
insreased role of an expanding NATO d the
eryense ofthe LIN Secrrdty Cormcil. It is dissd-
isfied with the prospect of a US-qponsored
theafire missile defence Erst€m in East Asi4 in
particular in Taiwan and Japan, with increased
US arms sales to Taiwan and the strengthming
of US defence links with Japan and South Korea.
China poims out that, at the same time, the
Unit€d Stdes, inthename ofregional stability, is
r€quiring it to coryly stictly with idemaional
anns coffiol agre€meds.
84. China is worried about US policy in Kos-
ovo and afraid itmay serve ari a precedem if Chi-
na decides to take action in regions where there is
gfowing etbnic Erest, suc,h as western Xinjiang
and Tibeg or to assimilate Taiwan by force.
85. In 1978 Deng Xiaoping launchd his mod-
enrisation initiative to taosform China imo a
strong, unified and wealthy nmion whose all-
rormd national strength would make it respected
worldwide and dominao in Asia. Mdemisation
was concenrated in the fields of industry, tech-
nology, agricultre and the armed forces. The
United Stafies is aware that China's emerging
economic, military and political ponrer has the
t2
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pot€xilial, s@ner or liat€r, to challe,nge vital US
interests on a number of issues and destabilise
Existing regional security. Clearly, recognition of
China as the fore,most power in Asia could only
take place d the expense of US influence in the
region.
86. Since the eveds in Kosovo, where NATO
acted without a UN mandate to stop human
rights' violdions by the Yugoslav Governme,ff
within its ovm te,rritory the Chinese mititary, like
the country's politicians, are worried about pos-
sible US military artion in East Asia. With'its
recemt Kosovo in min4 the Chinese
leadership considers US behaviour less predict-
able than &rdng the cold war. It is worried that
the Americans migh take artion against North
Korea or in the Taiwan Straits. At the same time,
the Chinese miftary t€nds 1s think that the US is
using NATO as an instnrmemt for possible cdsis-
imervention in Europe and fu Defence Treaty
with Japan in the same wzty in Asia. A Chinese
military expert concluded tersely tbat, in his
opinioq the US objective was 'to qreate in the
2lst cemry a Roman-sQyle imperial ryatem rm-
der US alominatiomo slowing the e,mergence of a
muttipolar worl4 exterding rmipolar domination
and actually making fuelf iuto the latest globat
emlreror in hrman history''lo.
87. Notwithsanding the rivalry that cxists
bstvveen China andthe United States, the Chinese
are apparemtly fascinat€d by the United States as
a bluepriut for their own dwelopment imo a
modern, indusrialised society.
88. Opinionpolls among China's younger g€n-
eration have consistently shoum that t}€y regard
the United St*es as the nation that is most hos-
tile to Chin4 but at the same time the Unit€d
States was considered the most desirable over-
seas corffiyto visit and strdy.
89. The Chinese leadership knows full well
tlat the tnrly decisive baftles are the economic
ones that take place on the American market,
which in the absence of any protective barriers
for the past five years or morg have been ab-
sorbmg most of China's conrmercial surplus.
90. US Secretary of State Madeleine Atbdgh
paid an official visit to China from 28 February
to 2 March 1999. Relations between the two
r0 Peng Glungqim as quoted :mt}re Walt SVeet Jow-
nal,15 S€ptember 1999.
couutries had det€riorated over human righs,
Uade relations, the banning of US satellite sales
to China and US plans for a theate missile de-
fence (IMD) system for Asia.
91. In its annual report on human rights pub-
fshd on 26 Febnrary 1999, the US State De-
parmed asserted ttrat the Chinese authorfies'
record on human rights had worse,ned during
199E. China accused the United States of med-
dling in China's fut€rnd aftirs by "fabricating
tmwarraded charges". The United States was
displeased atthe crackdovm on organised dissed
and the Seoetary of State calld for the release
of a number of political prisoners. Nwertheless,
Iv(rs Albrigh confirmed thd the United Stares
was maintaining its policy of not linking human
righs and trade issues.
92. Prime }vlinister fru Rongii paid his first
official visit to the United States on 6-14 April
1999. On that occasion, Presided Climon deliv-
ered a conciliatory address, stating that bringing
China ido the World Trade Orgmisaim was de,f-
initely in the imerests of the United States. Both
leaders stdd thd they were oommifred to e
agreemetr mthis issuebeforethe end oftbe 5rear.
WI. Relolionswith the European Union
93. China is aware of the existence of the EU
and of its ecmomic importance. On the other
han4 it does not have a very higlh opinion of its
role in world politics. China thinks tha! particu-
larly in secruity and defence ma:fters, Europeans
are much too tied to the Unitd States' apron
strings.
94. The inricacies of the dwelopmem of a
European Cornmon Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) andNATO's role inthat frameworkmay
be difficuh for China to understand 
- 
let alone
exactly what is involved in the process of merg-
ing WEU with the EU. At the momeut, it would
appearthat China is trying to use Europe and the
EU in its coftest with the United States. One of
the clearest messages tranmitted to the WEU
Asse,mbly's delegation was that Europe should
not stand for a unipolar world in which the only
power to decide right from wrong is the United
States. Europe should have its ovm policy and
make its ovm conaibution to establishing and
maintaining a multipolar world. It should also
make every effort to bolster the United Nations
Security Council's unique authority in crisis-
prevertion and management.
13
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95. The European Union makes play of the
fact thd China is now its third 6qg imFortad
non-European tading partner while the Union is
fuelf China's third largesttrading partner.
96. The Union's main slje€tiyg is for Chinato
be imegrated rapidly and fully into the int€,rna-
tional c,orrrmunity, both politically and economi-
cally. It supports the process of economic and so-
cial reform in China and bads Chi-
na's tansition to an ope,n society based on the
nrle of law and respect for human rigbits, beliw-
ing this will benefit China's developmemt and
leadto gr:er;tur global stability. It also wams Chi-
na to be more integrated into the world econony
and play a firll part inthe worldtrade rystem-
97. The European Union is commited to com-
prehensive engagem€,rt with China and political
dialogue betwe€n the two is being enhanced both
bilaterally and through Asian and global fora-
The first EU-China $rrmmt was held in London
in April 199E at heads of govermed lwe! pW-
ting EU relations with China on a par with those
with the Unit€d States, Japan and Russia. The
second EU-ChiDa Srrrrmit tmk place in Beijing.
The EU's strat€gy is laid out in a policy docu-
med mtitled'tsuilding a Coryrehe,nsive Part-
nership with China", whie,h was endorsed by the
EU's fifteen governmeds in June 1998. In Octo-
ber that year, Cornmissim President JacEres
Samer ceme,uted the new relationship during his
official visit to Beijrng.
98. The Eruopean Union, while welcoming
some positive developmemts with rqgard to Chi-
na's involvemed with LJN human rights mech-
anisms, has remained critical of continuing large
scale violations of human rights in China. In
particular, the action taken against political
dissidefis in China as well as the issue of the
death penalty have placed a gd strain on the
EU-China dialogue on human righs. The Euro-
pean Union has cominued to pursue this dialogue
with China of which the most rec€mt rormd took
place in Berlin in February 1999. A third legal
se,minar took place in Bonn in May 1999. The
European Union wisbes to make the dialogue
more concrete and orieuted towards progress on
the ground.
99. The European Union aims tor broaden the
scope of its political dialogue with China so :ts to
address issues ofglobal interest such as the fight
against drug trafficking, money-laundering, or-
ganised crime, and illegal irrmigrati6rq all areas
where EU competeirce has been enhanced under
the Amsterdam Treaty'l.
100. Europe and China also cooperate dosely
through the ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) pro-
cess, larmched in Bangkok in 1996. This is nonr a
broad fonrm for indepth consltations betwe€n
European and Asianparhers and has prompted a
wide series of cooperation initiaives. China has
been partioilarty active in all ASEM economic
cooperation initiatives and is organising the sec-
ond ASEM conference on human rights in Bei-
jing in 1999.
DI The role of the United Ndions
l0l. At the parly LJN Cr€neral Assembly meet-
in& China's Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan5 de-
clared tlat respect for national sovereigmy and
non-iderference in another couffiy's aftirs were
'the basic principles goveming imernational rela-
tions" and that any dwiation from this principle
could lead to a new form of gunboat diplomacy
that would wreak havoc"l2. to Foreigtr
Ivlinister Tang, the outbreak of war in Kosovo
had sounded a universal dam-
102. China ataches great importance to the
United Nations Secudty Council as a hedge ag-
aia* possible hege, onic be,haviour on the part of
the United States and a guarautee of a multipolar
world.
X Spy case
103. A US Congressional Commitee reporf the
Cox Report claimed tbag over the previous two
decades, China had rmproperly and strstemati
cally acryired valuable tec,hnology with possible
nilitary application from the Unit€d Stat€s. The
report cotrained allegations that China had pro-
cured rocket and missile tec,hnology by conduct-
ing commercial satellite launches for US com-
panies. It also claimed that China in the 1980s
had stolen nuclear weirpofit techmology from the
US Energy Deparme,ln's laboratories in order to
dwelop aneutronbomb.
104. On 6 March 199| the New York Times
published a report claiming thc a Chinese-
American sciemtisg Wen Ho [.ee, working at the
u lMemoraadum by the European Unim a the 54th
United Naions General Assembly.
12 Intemationat Herald Tfibtme, 24 Sepember 1999.
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Los Alamos nuclear weapCIut laboratory in New
Mexico, had helped China develop the W-88
miniranre nuclear warhead. This imellige,nce pro-
vided China with the capacity to deploy multiple
warheads on its newgeneration mobile intercon-
tircmtal ballistic missiles by 2002. Publication of
the report led to the dismissal of Mr Lee from the
Ios Alamos laboratory for allEged security viola-
tions. Further claims, published on E Aprit al-
leged that China had stolen vital neuuon bomb
data fromthe United States as early as 1995.
105. A declassified version of the Cox report
was ev€mrally released to the public on 25 May
1999. The re,port srongly criticisedtwo US com-
msrcial satellite manufrchrrers, Loral Corpora-
tion and Hughes Electronics, for breac,hing US
export regulations by supplying China with
rocket-launch tec,hology which had military ap-
plications.
106. The Cox Report claimed that the alleged
espionage had giveir China the potemial to build
a weapom progamme "on a pat''with US ttr;h-
nological abilities, but the exted of the iftelli-
gence losses was Erestioned by analysts.
107. In the meautime, the FBI has found new
widence which does not emirely exonerate the
Los Alamos laboratory or Mr Lee but suggests
that the most likely orign of the informatim is
one of the weapons "intqgrators". This new
analysis of the case was said to have provided
convincing evid€nce that China could have ob-
tained classified information aborf the W-88 and
other US nuclear warheads".
){1. The bombing of the Chinae Embassy
in Belgrade
10t. On the everfng of 7 May 1999, the Chi-
nese Embassy was hit by bombs dropped by a
US Airforce B-2 stealthbomber. These desroyed
a part of the embassy buildiog killing three Chi-
nese citizens and injuing 20 others. China re-
actd with anger. There were major protests in
Beljlng and elsewhere inthe couutry, endorsed by
the Governm€rf, and a mob bumed the home of
the US Consul{eneral in the city of Chengdu.
China accused NATO of pursuing "absolute
gunboat diplomacy'' in Yugoslavia and called for
an official NATO apology. The word was that
China expected significaut concessions on mili-
tary, tade and diplomatic issues to get the rela-
tionship bstwe€n China and the Unit€d Stat€s
backto normalla.
109. On 14 May, Presidemt Clidon delivered a
personal apology and explanation for the Em-
bassy attackto President Jiang 7.hernin. Later, on
15-17 June, a US delegation ld by Under-Secre-
tary of State Thomas Pi&ering visitd Beijrng to
provide an official explanation of the bombing.
President Cliuton's apology, which claimed that
it had been a "tragic mistake", was.repeaed.
Under-Secretary of State PickeriDg asserted that
human emor, frulty databases, orrdated maps
and a failed target rwiew process had caused the
"accidd'. Ctina's Foreign }vlinister Tmg Jiaruan
rejected the US explanation as 'hot convincing"
and dmanded that those responsible be swe,rely
punished.
)ilL haent stde ofChina's annedforca ond
their rnodqdisdion
ll0. Notwithsmding the fict thd the People's
Uberation Army (PLA) is the largest in the
worl4 it appears incapablg both doctinally and
in practice, of carrying out mode,rn warfare oper-
ations.
lll. China's defence budget officially stands at
US$ 12.7 billioq or l.2Yoof GDP.
ll2. The preseutday army is the product of a
doctrine that has iwariably mphasised the tlreat
fromthe landward side. The navy,l1%o made up
of mall ships unable to operate on the high ssas,
is essemially a coastal flest acting as a deterrerxt
to any seaward attaclc The airforce is similarly
la*ing inmdem equiprmm and curretrly has a
purely defe,lrsive role.
ll3. In short China is faced with the military
conundnrm of e,fiering the 2lst cffarry with
weapom that date back to the 1950s and 70s. To
medion only a few examples, its adi-aircraft
detection and defence systems are completely
out-ofdate; less tlan l0%o of its large surface
vessels are equipped with arrti-aircraft weapons,
its conman4 comol conrmunications and imel-
ligence syste,ms are also fairly primitive and its
electronic warfarc assets, both defensive and
offensive, where they exist at all are obsolete.
Aircraft are not able to provide mough air cover
for troops and there is no imqgrated C3 system
13 International Herald Tribme,zG2lNorember f 999.
l5
la Financial Times, l2N4ay 1999.
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for combined air, land and sea force operations.
Lastly, advances in military technolory, suc,h as
stealtl or "smart" weaponry are shrdied only
exceptionally.
ll4. The fact that China's defence syst€m is
today completely outofdate raises two difficul-
ties. It 15 irryrossible in the very near firarre for
quatrity wen partially to compensate for lack of
Erality, whioh puts the army in a posfion of
weakness. In the longer t€, China will find it
necessaryto replace agod deal of its equipment,
6i high cosL if it wads to remain credible.
ll5. The army feels it is being squeezed be-
tween a society imemupon economic grovrh and
the prospect of firhre high-tech military opem-
tions, which the coumy is rmable to moud" In
the l9E0s, China startd to became aware of the
shortcomings in fu amed forces and in Jrme
1995 Chinese leaders announced major changes
to the PLA's objectives.
116. The new docnine in fact prepared the PLA
for undertaki4g limit€d peripheral warfrre or
respondingto serious crises withinthe coumy.
ll7. The PI-A has tak€n st€ps to modernise its
forces and is focusing on the building of rapid
reaction forces tlat can project power. Total
marFolver will be rducd from 2.5 to l.E mil-
lion A non-commissioned officer corps is to be
tainsd, so as to keep expertise in the ranks. The
period of enlishe,rt has been reduced from four
years to two. Training is to be improved and the
objective is to educate fewer people to take on
more responsibility. Howwer it will take at least
another decade for the PI-A to meet the basic
rquireme,fis of a modem amed force and mod-
ennisation of the airforce will yield no credible
results,'ntil post-2010. Furthermore, the Chinese
thmselves acknowledgetlat as far as the nary is
corcemeq they will not have a credible fleet on
fis high seas this side of 2050.
)ilIL Chino's nu clem lorces
md ballittic missile systqr,
ll8. Nuclear capability stands at some 200
ground-toground ballistic missile warheads, plus
100-150 warheads in narial and airforce posses-
sion The main sljffiys of China's nuclear
forces is to demonstrate a genuine sfike capabil-
ity that the Americans and Russians will have to
reckon with- China wishes to assert its presence
in the world and to be capable of exerting pres-
sure when circumsancs d.'nand. Ittakes a long-
term view and is aware that time is on fu side.
I19. At present Chinese mrclear forces include
the following weapon s,6terns:
Tpe NWIO
desiomation
Mmbs
deployed
Year first
deoloved
Range
0on)
trIarheads
x vield
Warleadsin
stoc,koile
Aircmfi
H6 86 120 1965 3 100 l-3 bombs 120
o'5 A-5 30 1970 400 l xbomb 30
(mtd-based missiles
DF-3A cs$2 50 t977 2 800 lx3.3Mt 50
DF4 cs$3 20 1980 4750 lx3.3Mt 20
DF.sA css4 71 1981 l3 000 I xzl-5 Mt 7
DF.2IA cssS 36 1985-86 I 800 I x 200-300 kt 36
SLBMy
Iulans-l cs$N-3 72 1986 I 700 I x 200-300 kt 12
Tacticalweaporu
Artillery/ADNds, Short-
ranee missiles Lowkt 120
' It is said that curre, tly about 18 DF-5A missiles are deployd (Financial Times,3 June 1999.)
120. Three stratEgic missiles arc currently un-
der dwelopmem in China. The DF-31 @ong-
feng) is n mobile ICBM (Id€rcoftinemtal
Ballistic Missile) with a 5 000-mile (8 000-hn)
range and a single 700-4nuclear warhead which
is erpected to be operational within two years.
The first test flight tmk place on 2 August 1999.
The use of solid-propeUant engineering is a
t6
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testimony to the advanced technology used in
dwelorping the missile. Some l0 b 20 DF-31
missiles may be deploye{ replacing the DF4,
which has hatf the range and was developed in
the 1960s. ln the meaffime, China is developing
the DF4l missile with a 12 000-h range which
could enter service aroundthe year 2005.
l2l. Dwelopmeut of a secondge,lreration sub-
marine-larmched ballistic missile (SLBM) Julang
tr (III,tr) may be completed by 2002 and 16
missiles will be carried by the first Tpe 094
nuclear-fuelled ballistic submarine (SSBM) when
it emers service in 2009 or 201015. The JG-2
missile has a t 000-h range and will be able to
carry one 200-300-lt warhead. The T5'pe 093
nuclear submarine with dedicated non-ballistic
missile launchers (SSGI$ is expected to be
launched in 2000.
122. The United States plans to dwelop 4 mis-
sile defence systm for its allies in Asia and to
dwelop a national missile defence. This is con-
side,red to be a violation of the 1972 Afr-Bal-
listic Missile (ABM) Treaty an4 combined with
tbe US Senate's decision of 13 October 1999 not
b ratiry the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT), has caused great concern in China
which argues that it could dangerously altsr the
stategic balance in Asia and the rest ofthe world
and evm leadto a nes, nuclear anns race.
123. China's nuclear ballistic missile force has
always been limite4 but is strategically the
counfy's onlyuump card andmeans of wieldiqg
influmce in its oqm region an{ if need be,
elsewhere. The creation of a national ballistic
missile defe,lrce in the United States and of a
more limited ballistic missile defeirce for US
allies in Asia such as Japa4 Taiwan and South
Kore4 could give China the feeling that it is
trapped in its own comer and deprived of any
meaili of pursuing what it regards as its vital
national fut€rests.
124. China has already started 16 implememt a
US$ l0 billion progmrnme to improve its nuclear
forces. Solid-fuel technology for its missiles will
Erhance its nuclear forces credibilty as insan-
taneous missile launch capabrlity yill make fu
forces survivable and provide a second strike
capability for retaliation- It is also dweloping
'5 The Milituy Balmce tggStgg,pge 169, trSS, ft-
ober 1998.
sophisticated multiple warhead trchnology which
could enable itto penehate an anti-missile shield.
125. It is hardly surprising that such dwelop-
me,nts are causing concern in India and Pakistan
which may feel compelled to mode,rnise their oum
forces.
)IV Chin a's non-prolifadion p oW
126. China's position is improving in so far as
weapons proliferation is ccncerned. In the 1980s,
China was one of the major proliferaton of
nuclear-related technology, assising nuclear pro-
grarrmes in no less tlan ten cotrutries, including
Algeri4 kan, kaq and Pakistan. However, in
1992, Chiaa acceded to the Nuclear Non-pro-
liferation Treaty (NPT) and reputedly complies
with its treaty obligations.
127. China signed the Comprehe,nsive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 and on 24 Octobsr 1999
Presided Jiang pledged that it would ratify its
obligations under the Treaty, at the same time
crficising the US Se,nate for its refusal to ratify.
China furthermore ratified the Chemical \trap-
ons Conve,ntion m1997 and has pledged to abide
by the requirements of the Missile Tec,hology
Comol Regime (MTCR), although it has yet to
become a firll me,mber. It became paxty to the
Biolqical md Toxic Weapms Ccnvertion (BWC)
in 1984, but the US Arms Control and Disarma-
med Agmcy concluded in its 1997 report that it
was highly probable 'that China was not in
with its obligations under the BWC".
XV. China and the crick in East fimor
128. China's policy inthe East Timor crisis has
shovm how much iryortance it ataches to
maintaining the legitimacy of the United Natims
as an organisation for worldwide prwemion and
manag€me,il of crises. At the same time, China
has been conductiag itself in such a way as to
emhance its image as a responsible power and to
increase its influence in South-Eas Asia.
129. Once lndonesia had succ.umbed to futer-
national pressure and agred to intemational
involvement, China voted in favour of UN Se-
curity Council Resolution 1264 wbtch authorised
the establishemt of a muhinational Australian-
led force to restore peace and security in East
Timor. lndonesia's agrememt to the IJN presence
ensured that China's strict adherence to the
17
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principle of non-iuterveution in the idemal af-
fairs of sovereign stat€s was not c;hallenged.
130. The East Timor crisis also hrd positive re-
sults for China's policy of weakening the in-
fluence of the US-qponsored security network in
the rqgion-
l3l. In 1995, Indonesia and Australia con-
cluded a security cooperation pact with positive
mcouragemetr fromthe unit€d Staes. Together,
Indonesia andAustralia coffiolthe srafu linking
15s Indian and Pacific Oceans. One of the objec-
tives ofthe security pact was to eirsure tlat Aus-
Ealia and Indonesia w€re not drawn or pressured
into China's qphere of influe,lrce. Indonesia was
also determinedto standupto China and Chinese
t€rritorial claims in the South China Sea, where
Beijtng may be evincing an imerest in Indonesia's
gas-rich Natma Islands.
132. In Sept€rnber 1999, Ausmalian reaction to
the post-referendum violence in East Timor md
the Austrafian Prime Minister's public criticim
of the 1995 security pact (ertercd into by the
previous govermed) caused Indonesia to ab-
rogate the pact milaterally.
133. East Timor's indqrendence aod increasing
calls for independence for the province of Aceh,
have caused ooncems in neighboudng couutries
in south-east Asia tbat Indonesia mighrt disin-
tegrale firther. Indonesia comprises about 400
differe,rt ethnic and religious groups and AcelU
Jrian Ja5a, South Sulawesi and the Matuku
Islands are already demanding independence. An
ustable and weake,lred Indonesia could be to the
detrimem ofthe secruity ofthe etrire rqgon
134. If Indonesia ce:ses to be a bulwark of
resistance to China in the South China See the
later 
-ight seize the opporOmity to fitexd its
influence in the regroq having already taken
afiruntage of the military wealoess of the Phil-
rppines to consolidate its grlp on Mischief Reef.
XVL China's accession to the
World Trade 0rg anis aion (W'TO)
135. On 15 Novemb€r 1999, the Unit€d States
and China amormced that th€y bad concluded a
comprehensive agreemflt opening up the Chinese
economy to foreign competition in retunx for
China's effiy ido the World Trade Organisation
(W'fO) 
- 
thereby resolving China's trade dis-
putes with the United States. The US-China
agre€xn€d on China's effiy itrto the WTO does
not require the approral of the US Congress.
Howwer, the Congress would hane to graf
China permaned normal fade staUrs, formerly
knovm as "most-frvoured nation stah$". The
Cqgress thereforc has to approve a change to
the Jaclcson-Vanik amendme,nt to the Trade Ast
of 1974, which requires Congress to rwiew
China's trade status amually. This will certainly
be the occasion of heated debate on China's
human righs recor4 its policy towards Taiwan
and otbsr China-relded issues which normally
elicit swere crfical cornmert from Congress, but
most observers takethe viewtrat a defeat in any
vote on pe,rmanem normal tade stahrs for China
is probably out ofthe Erestion
135. Howwer, China still has to nqgotiate ag-
reemeds with the European Unioq Brazil, Can-
ada, India, Switzerlan{ and a number of devel-
oping cotffiies before the WTO can discuss its
application Bilat€ral agreemexils with Japan and
Australia have already been concluded
137. The European Union estimates that the
Us{hina agrffi€d covers 80% of Eurqte's
concenus 
- 
which leaves 20o/o of Europe's de-
mands to be negotiated. The outstanding nego-
tiations are not erryected to presed an obstacle to
China's becoming a WTO me,mber next year.
138. Nwertheless, one important problem that
r€mains to be resolved is the position of Taiwao
China does not wadto beloag to an ide,rnational
where Taiwan is a member anq at
presetr, Taiwan is also a candidate for WTO
membership. WTO member states may have to
make a c,hoice between the two. Howwer, if they
are not prepared to do sq China may have to
take its ovm decision. Whichwer way things fall
out the decision may have far-reaching conse-
que,nces inthe rqgion.
139. Most obse,rvers agree that the US-China
agreemed rqlreserts a major victory for Prime
Ivlinister Zhu Rongii who is an advocate of re-
form-
140. It is assumed in China thd WTO etry
will push the couutry towards political reform,
although no{xre expects the leadership to em-
brace any substamive changes immediately. It
should not be forgotten that one of the leader-
ship's main sonsiderations in pushing for the
l8
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couutr5r's membership of the WTO has bwn the
hope of atracting the increased foreign invest-
mentthatis esse,ntial for economic growtl, which
is in arm a requiremem for social stability. Chi-
nese leaders amicipte that the achiwemed of
those objwtives will heh consolidate Commrnist
Partyrule.
l4l. WTO membership will also replace the
present experimemal economic dwelopmem
model with more orderly dwelopmed towards a
market economy. In the long nm, the market wifl
inwitably become a grater factor in determining
reforms thanthe party leadership.
142. China's membership of the WTO will fir-
ther strengthen efforts to establish the rule of law
within the country and consolidde the domestic
legal system at the expense of the prese,rt ar-
bitrary rqgime rmder Conrmunist Party cortrol.
The speed at which reform takes place should
not, howwer, be overestimated-
l9
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